Taxation and the Demand for Gambling: New Evidence from the United Kingdom. by David Paton et al.
W or ki ng  Pa pe r s  in  E c onom i cs
D ep ar tm ent  o f   Eco no m ics, Ren ss elaer   Po ly techn ic  In stitu te,  1 10   8 
t h Street, Tro  y ,  NY , 1  21  80 - 35 90 ,  U SA .  Tel:  +1 - 51 8- 
2 76 -6 38 7 ;  Fax :  +1 -5 1 8- 27 6 -2 23 5;  URL:  http ://ww w.r pi.edu /dept/econ om ics /;  E-Mail:  keen ak@ rp i.edu 
Tax at io n   and   th e  Deman d  for  Gamb li ng :   New  Ev id en ce from
t he  Uni t ed   Ki ng do m
D avid  Paton
U nive rs ity   of  N ottingham 
D onald  Sie ge l
Renss elaer   Poly te chnic   Institute 
Leighton  V augha n  Williams 




F or   m or e  i nf orm at ion  and  to browse and downl  oad  fur ther   R enssel aer  W orking Papers i  n
E conomi cs,   please  visi t:   htt p:/ /www. rpi. edu/dept /econom ics/www/workingpapers/ 2
T AX AT ION   A ND   THE  DE M AN D  FOR   GAM B LI NG:
N EW  E VI D EN CE   FR OM   T HE  UN I TE D  KI N GD OM 
August 2003
Dr.   Davi d  Pat on
S enior  Lectur er   i n  Indust ri al   E conom i cs
Not ti ngham   Univer si t y  Business  School 
Wol laton  Road
Not ti ngham   NG8  1BB
Uni ted  Kingdom
T el :  +44 115 846 6601
F  ax: +44 115 846 6667
E mail :  David. Paton@Not ti ngham .ac.uk
P rofessor  Donal d  S.   Si egel
P rofessor of   Econom i cs
Depar tm ent   of   E conom ics
S age  Bui lding-Room  3502
Renssel aer   P olytechnic  I nst it ut e
110 8
th St reet 
T roy,   NY 12180-  3590
T el :  (518)   276- 2049
F ax:  (518)   276- 2035
E mail :  sieged@r pi .edu
P rofessor  Lei ghton  Vaughan  Wi ll i am s
P rofessor of   Econom i cs  and  Fi nance
Not ti ngham   T r ent  Uni versi ty
Bur ton  Str eet 
Not ti ngham   NG1  4BU
Uni ted  Kingdom
T el :  +44 115 848 5516
F  ax: +44 115 848 6829
E mail :  Lei ght on.Vaughan- Wil li am s@ntu. ac.uk3
3 
TAXATIO N  AND  TH E  DEMAND  FOR  G AMBLING : 
NEW EVIDENCE FROM TH  E UNITED KINGDOM
Abstract 
I n  October   2001,  the  U.K.   gover nment   im pl em ent ed  a  dr am ati c  shi ft   i n  t he  taxati on  of 
gam bl ing,  resul ti ng  in  a  substanti al   decl ine  i n  taxes  l evi ed  on  U.K.   bookmakers.     Usi ng  dat a  bef or e
and  aft er   this  event,   we  present  economet ri c  evi dence  on  the  dem and  r esponse  to  t his  t ax  reducti on.
Our   r esult s  suggest   that   the  dem and  for   bookmaker   gam bl i ng  i s  highl y  sensit ive  to  taxat ion  rat es
and  t hat   t he  decl ine  i n  the  r at e  of  taxat ion  l ed  to  a  l arge  increase  i n  the  dem and  f or  on-shor e
bet ti ng.     We  al so  f i nd  some  evi dence  of   pri ce- induced  substi t ut ion  acr oss  dif fer ent  segment s  of  the
gam bl ing  i ndust ry.    The  U.K.  pol icy  ini ti at i ve  m ay  pr ovi de  usef ul   i nform ati on  f or  pol icy  maker s  in
other   countr i es  who  ar e  contempl at ing  changes  in  gambli ng  taxat ion. 4
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T axation and  the  De mand  for   Gambling:  N ew   E videnc e  fr om  the  Unite d
Kingdom
1.  In trodu ct i on 
Gam bl ing  is  r elativel y  soci  al  ly acceptable in the U.K. and has r  arely engendered any
concert ed  religious  opposi ti on,   in  cont rast  to  the  U.S.     I ndeed,  m uch  of  t he  gambl ing  acti vi ty  in  t he
U.K.  occur s  at  st reet  cor ner  bet ti ng  shops,   of ten  i n  the  m ost   f ashi onabl e  secti ons  of   Bri ti sh  ci t ies. 
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T wo  r ecent   events  were  al leged  to  have  had  a  del eteri ous  eff ect   on  such  gam bl ing  est abl ishm ent s: 
( a)   t he  intr oduct ion  of  the  U.K.   Nat i onal   L ott er y  i n  1996  and  ( b)   t he  ri se  of   of f- shore  I nt ernet 
bookm  akers, who are not subject   to bett  ing taxes and thus can ser  iousl  y under  mi  ne the com  pet  it  ive
posit ion  of  tradi ti onal  bookm akers.
T hese  envi ronment al   changes  sti m ul at ed  an  i m port ant   publ ic  poli cy  debate  in  t he  U. K. 
r egar di ng  opt im al   l evels  of   t axati on  for  di f ferent  types  of  gam bl ing.    S i mi lar  issues  have  ari sen  i n
t he  U.S . , as st  at  es becom  e incr  easingly dependent   on lot  tery revenues to fund educat  i  onal 
progr am s  ( Cl otf el ter   and  Cook  ( 1989) ) ,  whil e  also  viewi ng  casinos  as  a  t ool   f or   economi c
devel opm ent  (Sauer  (2001) ). 
I n  or der   t o  det er mi ne  an  appr opr iate  response  to  recent   changes  i n  the  gambli ng  industr y,   t he
U.K.  Gover nm ent   com m issi oned  a  com pr ehensive  r evi ew  of  bet ti ng  taxat ion  in  2000  (see  Paton, 
S iegel  and  Vaughan  Wil li ams,  2002)   which  led  t o  a  dramat ic  change  i n  t he  taxati on  of 
bookm aki ng  establ ishment s.    S pecif icall y,   t he  gover nm ent   announced  that  ‘General   Bet t ing  Dut y’ 
( hencef ort h,   GBD) ,  levied  as  a  per centage  of   bet t ing  st akes,   woul d  be  replaced  by  a  ‘Gr oss  Profi t s
T ax’  (hencef ort h,   GP T) ,  based  on  t he  net  revenue  of   bookmaker s.     The  change  f rom   GBD  to  GPT 
                                                   
1 See  Sau er   ( 2 00 1)   f o  r a trenchan t  an aly sis  o f  th e  p olitical  eco no my   of   g amb ling   regu latio n  in  th e  U .S .  Fo  r
iss ues  r elating   s pecif ically  to   In dian  gamin g,  s ee  An der s  et  al.  (1 9 98 ).5
5 
signi fi cantl y  r educed  the  eff ect ive  incidence  of   taxati on  on  bookmaker s  and  ended  the  dir ect   t ax
l evied  on bet  tors.
T he  pur pose of this st  udy i  s to exam  i  ne t  he ef  fects of these changes on the dem  and f  or
bet ti ng.     The  r em ai nder  of  the  paper   is  organi zed  as  fol lows.     Sect i on  I I   provi des  a  br ief  discussi on
of  recent  adj ustm ent s  to  the  st r uctur e  of   bett ing  t axat i on  i n  t he  U. K.     The  f ol l owing  secti on  out li nes
t  he econom  et  r  ic m  odel that we use to assess the impact of these t  ax changes on bet  ti  ng demand. 
S ecti on  IV  descri bes  t he  data  and  Secti on  V  pr esent s  our   empi ri cal  findi ngs.    T he  fi nal   sect ion
consi st s  of  preli mi nar y  concl usi ons  and  suggesti ons  f or   addi t ional  resear ch.
II.   G am b li ng  Taxati on  Ref orm  in   th e  U.K .
Bet ti ng  taxat ion  was  i nt r oduced  in  t he  U. K.   in  1966,  at   a  rat e  of   2. 5% , and was incr eased t o
5%  ei ght een  months  lat er .     Al though  thi s  was  r educed  by  a  per cent age  poi nt  in  1972,  it  cont i nued
t o  cl im b  unt i l  it   r eached  a  peak  of  8%  befor e  bei ng  t ri m med  back  to  7. 75%   i n  1992  and  t o  6. 75% 
i  n 1996.    The 1996 reduct  ion was i  n  response  t o  the  i nt r oduct ion  of   the  Nat ional   L ot t er y,   which
was  viewed  as  a  danger   t o  t he  st reet - corner   bett i ng  est abl ishment s.   Anot her   cri t ical   change
occur red  i n  1987,   when t  he tax on wager  s pl  aced at the racet  r  ack was abol  ished. 
Deducti ons  f aced  by  bett ors  wer e  generall y  levied  by  bookm akers  at  a  higher   r at e  t han  t he
bet ti ng  tax  rat e,   specif i call y at 10%   when the general rat  e was 8%,   and 9% when it   was 6.  75%  .
T he  bookmaki ng  establi shm ents  assert ed  that   this  pr em ium   was  char ged  t o  cover   paym ent s  to  t he
L evy  Board  f or managing the hor  se-  racing segment   and also  handli  ng char  ges, such as non- 
r ecover abl e  sal es  t axes,   in  t he  form   of   VAT   ('Val ue  Added  Tax') .
T he  t hr eat   t o  t he  U. K.   bookmaki ng  sector  fr om  the  Nat ional   L ott er y  was  exacer bat ed  i n  t he
l at e  1990s  by  t he  wi despr ead  di f fusi on  of   t he  Int er net  and  t he  concomi tant  ri se  in  t he  use  of  hom e6
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per sonal   com put er s  for   entert ai nment .     The  new  t echnology  led  t o  the  r ise  of  on- li ne  gambli ng, 
whi ch  posed  a  ser ious  thr eat  to  the com peti t ive  posit  ion of “br  icks and mor  tar” gambl  ing
est abli shm ent s. 
I n  response  to  these  pressures,   the  U.K.  gover nm ent   i nst it ut ed  a  radical   reform   of   t he
t axat ion  str uct ur e of U.  K. bookm  aking, swit  chi  ng fr  om   a tax on turnover (revenue) to a tax on
gross  pr of it s.    T hi s  r ef orm   was  accom pani ed  by  a comm  it m ent  from  the  m aj or  U. K.   bookm aker s  to
close  down  and  repat ri at e  t o  the  U.K.   all   of   t hei r  of fshor e  operati ons,  and  t o  aboli sh  deducti ons  on
bet s  pl aced  wit h  them.     Speci fi cal ly,   t he  r eform   involved  a  swi tch  from  a  t ax  on  r evenue  (General 
Bet ti ng  Duty) ,  of   6. 75  per  cent ,   t o  a  t ax  on  t he  gr oss  profi t s  of   bookmaker s  (i . e. ,  their   gr oss  revenue
m inus  what   t hey  pay  out  to  wi nners)  of  15  per  cent.     Pr i or   t o  t he  swit ch,   dat a  suppl i ed  t o  the
aut hors  by  HM  Custom s  and  E xcise  ( the  arm   of   t he  U. K.   governm ent  that  regul at es  the  bet ti ng
i ndustr y)  suggest s  that  bookm akers’  gross  pr of it s  wer e  approxim at el y  22  per   cent   of  revenue. 
T hus,   t he  swi tch  represented a hal vi ng  of   t he  ef f ecti ve  rate  of   t axati on  faced  by  bookm aker s.
P at on,  Siegel   and  Vaughan  Wil li ams  ( 2001b;  2002)   demonst rate  that   t he  key  econom ic
r at ional e  for   t he  poli cy  change  is  t hat   a  GP T  is  al locat ivel y  m or  e eff  ici  ent than a revenue tax.    T  he
f or mer  is levied on pr ice,  wher eas  a  revenue  t ax  is  l evi ed  on  quant i ty.    Consequentl y,  a  GP T 
provi des  f ir m s  wi th  an  i ncent ive  t o  reduce  their   margins  and  to  concentr ate  on  a  l ow- pr ice,   hi gh- 
r evenue  st rat egy,   i nst ead  of  a  high- pri ce,  low-r evenue  str at egy.
Another   point   i n  favor   of   t he  GP T  is  that   i t   encour ages  fi rm s  t o  focus  on  m ar gi ns. 
E conomi c  t heory  predicts  that   t his  wi ll   r esult   i n  a  l ower  tax  bur den  i n  sectors  such  as  onl i ne
bet ti ng,   whi ch  ar e  ext rem el y  com peti t ive  and  t hus  have  low  pr of it   l ow  mar gi ns.    Thus,   a  shi f t  fr om
GBD  t o  GPT   i s  expect ed  t o  enhance  the  abi li t y  of   Br it ish  bookmakers  to  compet e  in  a  rapidly
changing  t echnologi cal   and  gl obal  envir onment.     A  cor ol l ar y  of  this  is  t hat   a  gr eater   bur den  of  risk7
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i  s borne by the government under   a GP  T.    The r eason  i s  that in a cl i mate  of   i ncr easi ng
com peti t ion,   governm ent  tax  r evenue,   which  is  based  on  profi t   m ar gi ns,   m ay  be  l ess  st able  and
predi ct abl e. 
T he  U.K.   government   expected that a gross pr  of  it s  t ax  m ay  act uall y  gener ate  m or e  t ax
r evenue in t  he long run.    T  hat is because t  hey were convinced  t hat  reduci ng  r isk  f or   the  industr y
and  r educi ng  tax  rat es  woul d  enhance  indust  r y  com peti ti veness,
T o  summ ari ze,   t he  Br it ish  gover nment   identi f ied  sever al   chal l enges  to  the  onshor e  Br i ti sh
bookm aki ng  i ndust ry,   and  ther ef ore  i t s  own  medium   and  l ong-t erm   bet t ing  tax  r evenue  base,   f r om 
unt axed  of fshor e  com peti t ion  and  t echnologi cal   change.    In  r esponse  to  t his,  a  radical  new  bet ti ng
t ax  str uct ur e  ( based  on  mar  gi  ns rather than revenue) was i  nt  r  oduced in October 2001,   desi  gned to
all ow  onshor e  bookm akers  to  com pet e  mor e  ef f ecti vel y  wi t h  of f shor e  rival s.
III  Econ om et ric  Mod el  an d   Est im ati on   Tech ni q ues
As  noted  ear l ier,   we  wish  to  est  i mate the im  pact of the reduct  ion in gambl  ing taxat  ion on
bet ti ng  demand.     The  pur pose  of   this  sect ion  i s  to  outl i ne  t he  methodology  used  to  achi eve  thi s
obj ecti ve.     We  al so  consi der  sever al   econom etr ic  issues  that   ar e  rel evant   t o  thi s  type  of   st udy.  
2
We est im at e  var i ants  of 
t he  f ol l owing equat ion  f or   bett ing
dem and: 
( 1) 
                                                   
2 W e  do   n o t  pr o vide  a  co mp r eh en siv e  rev iew  of   th e  liter atu re  o n   the  d emand   fo r  gam blin g .    F or   su ch   a review,

















Qt =  dem and  f or   bett ing  dur i ng  t im e  per i od  t 
P  t = aver  age  pr ice  for   bet t ing dur  ing per  iod t.
P 
j
t = aver  age  pr ice  in  gambl ing  sector  j  dur ing  per i od  t .
Zt = a vector of addi  t ional   f actor s  that  infl uence demand in peri  od t  . 
T rend  =  ti me tr  end. 
µ  t = a st  ochast ic  err or  or   cl assi cal   di st ur bance  t erm .
I  f the dem  and f  unct i on  i s  speci f ied  in  logar it hm s,  α  0  consti t ut es  a  di rect  est im at e  of  the
short   r un  own  pri ce  el ast icit y,   which  i s  hypot hesized  t o  be  negat ive.    β j repr esent s  the shor  t run
cross  pr ice  elast ici ty  of   dem and  f or   bett ing  wit h  r espect  to  the  pr i ce  of   sector   j .    β j < 0 denot  es that 
bet ti ng  and sector j  are  complem ents;   β j > 0 indicat es  that   they  ar e  subst it utes. 
T he  vect or   Z incl udes  real  aver age  annual   earnings  (wages)   and  the  unempl oyment   rate, 
since t  hese factors have been shown in pr  evi  ous studi es  to  i nfl uence  t he  demand  for  gam bl ing  ( e. g.
T uckwel l   ( 1984)   T hal heim er  and  Ali   ( 1995) ,  Pat on,   S iegel   and  Vaughan  Wil l iams  ( 2001a) ).     Z
also  contains  t wo  dumm y  var iabl es  that  al low  us  to  cont r ol   f or  two  signi f icant  event s.    T he  fi rst   i s  a
dum my  f or  the  m onth  of   P r incess  Di ana’s  deat h,   i n  t he  i m medi ate  aft erm at h  of  whi ch  gambli ng
act ivit y  t hr oughout   the  U.K  decl ined  shar pl y.    T he  second  is  a  dumm y  var i able  f or  Oct ober   2001,
t he  m ont h  when  the  gam bl i ng  t ax  changes  wer e  f ul l y  im pl ement ed.     Thi s  takes  account  of  the
publi ci t y  that  surr ounded  t he  t ax  reducti on  and  whi ch  m ay  have  pr ovi ded  a  t em por ar y  boost   t o
dem  and.    Given that   the tax change was announced in Apr  i  l 2001 and that many bet  ti  ng compani  es
r educed  thei r   r at e  of  deducti ons  ( though  di d  not   repatr i at e  their   over seas  oper ati ons)  in  advance  of
t he  change,  the  t em por ar y  eff ect   m ay  be  evi dent  pri or   t o  Oct ober  of   this  year .    We  al low  for   t hi s  by
i ncludi ng  up  to  5  ‘ l eads’   of  thi s  var iabl e,   al though  for   r easons  of   space  we  repor t  onl y  the  est i mates
of the aggregat e  ef f ect. 
T he  i ncl usion  of  lagged  ter ms  al lows  us  t o  analyze  dynam ic  f act or s.     F or   exam pl e,  if 
gam bl ing  i s  ‘addi ct i ve’,   it s  long  run  pri ce  el ast icit y  may  exceed  i t s  short   r un  value.  In  t he  si m pl est9
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case  in  which  onl y  one  l ag  of   t he  dependent   vari abl e  is  incl uded  and  t her e  is  no  l agged  pri ce  ter m, 
t he  l ong  r un  el asti cit y  wil l  be  equal   t o  α  0 / (1  -   γ  1 ) .
An  econometr i c  concern  associ at ed  wi t h  esti m at ion  of  equat ion  ( 1)   i s  t hat   t he  pr ice
var iabl es  ar e  unl ikely  t o  be  exogenous.     If   the  exogenei ty  assumpti on  is  vi ol at ed,   or di nary  least 
squar es  (OLS )   yields  par ameter  est im ates  that  ar e  biased  and  inef fi cient .     Sever al   al ternat i ve
est im at ors  ar e  avai l able  that   coul d  provi de  us  wi th  unbi ased  and  ef f icient  econometr i c  esti m at es  of 
t he  key  param et er s.     T hese  esti m at or s  can  be  divi ded  bet ween  si ngle  equat ion met  hods such as
t wo-stage  least   squares  (2S LS ),   and  system  est im ators  such  as  t hr ee  st age  l east   squar es  ( 3S L S) ,  ful l
i nf or mat ion  maxim um   li kel ihood  (FI ML )   and  t he  gener al ized  met hod  of   moments  ( GMM). 
 3  F or   a
cor rect l y  speci fi ed  model ,  syst em  est im at or s  are  li  kely to be t  he m ost   ef fi ci ent .    However,   a
disadvantage  of   t he  syst em  appr oach  is  that   mi s- speci fi cat ion  i n  one  equati on  ( f or   exam pl e,   due  to
ser ial cor  rel  at ion)   can  aff ect  par am eter  est im at es  of   ot her  equat ions.     We  pr ef er  to  ri sk  t he  loss  of 
som e  ef f iciency  i n  ret ur n  f or   gr eater   r el iabil it y,  so  we  r eport   2SL S   est i mates.     I n  a  f ootnote  t o  t he
t able  r eport i ng  r egr essi on  resul ts,  we  ident if y  each  var iabl e  t hat  is  instr um ent ed  and  the  set   of 
i nstr um ent s  used.   I n  cases  i n  whi ch  t he  num ber of   addi  t  ional instr  ument  s exceeds the num  ber 
of  endogenous  var iables,   we  r eport   t he  Sargan  test  for  the  vali di ty  of   t he  over i dent i fying
r estr ict ions.     For  each  var iant   of   t he  regr ession  m odel ,   we  also  repor t  Whi te  st andar d  er ror s  that  ar e
r obust to het  er  oscedasti  cit y. 
S om e  ot her   econom et r ic/m easur em ent   i ssues  al so  need  t o  be  consi dered.    T hese  include
our   choi ce  of   a  f uncti onal  form   for  the  dem and  equati on,   t he  measur ement   of   pri ce,   specif icati on  of 
t he  t im e  t rend,   and  the  set   of  argum ent s  included  i n  the  dem and  equati on.     We  now  consi der  each
of these i  n tur  n. 
                                                   
3  A  detailed  d is cu ss ion   o f   alter n ativ e  estim ato rs   can be  fo un d   in,  f o r  ex amp le,  G reen e  ( 20 00 ) .10
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We  have  chosen  a  log-l inear   speci fi cat ion  f or   equati on  (1),   si nce  t hi s  all ows  t he
coeff ici ents  to  be  int er preted  as  el ast icit i es.    As  i t  tur ns  out,   our  key  f indi ngs ar  e robust to the use
of  a  li near  speci fi cat ion.
T he  conventi on  in  t he  academi c  lit er ature  on  gam bli ng  ( see,  for   exam pl e,   F arr el l   et  al , 
1999;   F orr est ,  Gull ey,   and  Si mm ons, 2000a;  2000b;   2002)   is  t o  m easur e  ‘pr ice’   as  t he  expect ed
val ue  of   a  bet.     Thi s  is  typi cal ly  comput ed  as  t he  percent age  of  a  uni t  bet   t hat ,  on  aver age,  is  not
r et ur ned  t o  bet tors.     In  some  i nst ances,  however ,   we  have  sel ected  instr ument s  for   pr ice.     In
par ti cul ar ,  the  pri ce  of   the  mai n  Nat ional  Lot ter y  dr aw  is  i nst rumented  by  the  val ue  of   r ol l over   and
addit ional   dr aws  in  that   mont h.     When  t he  appr opr iate  data ar  e not avail  abl e,   several   alt er nat ive
approaches  ar e  possi bl e.     F or   exam pl e,  in  t he  case  of   bett ing  pri ce,   dat a  are  avai lable  onl y  on  the
t ax  r at e,  whi ch  i s  a  signif icant   det erm inant   of  pri ce.    This  al lows  us  t o  dir ect ly  esti mate  the
elast ici ty  of   bet ti ng  dem and  wi t h  respect   t o  t he  tax  rat e.     Another   advantage  of   usi ng  the  tax  r ate  i s
t hat  thi s  var iabl e  is  exogenous  and  does  not   r equir e  the  use  of   i nst ruments.    F or  bi ngo,  Lot tery
S cr at chcar ds,   t he  L ott er y  T hunderbal l   draw,   and  the  L ot t er y  Ext ra  dr aw  we  have  no  dat a  relat ing
dir ectl y  t o  pri ce  changes.    F or   vari ous  L ot t er y  product s,  we  use  dum my  vari ables  t o  denot e  tim e
per  iods when such  pr oduct s  have  been  avai lable  on  t he  m arket .     These  events  are  cl ear ly
exogenous  and  can  be  used  t o  det er mi ne  subst it ut i on  or  com pl ement ar i ty  i n  t he  demand  equati ons
f or   other  sectors.    In  t he  case  of   bi ngo,   we  use  demand  in  pl ace  of   pr ice  i n  the  dem and  equati ons
f or   other  sectors.    As  bi ngo  dem and  may  be  endogenous,  we  instr um ent   t hi s  var iable  by  l agged
dem and.     Alt hough  bi ngo  dem and  is  cor related  acr oss  t im e  per i ods,   i t   i s  not   clear  that  this  vari abl e
i s  a  val id  i nst rument.     Thus,   we  view  our   r esult s  r egar ding  subst it uti on  fr om   bi ngo  to  bett i ng  as
som ewhat   specul at ive.11
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We  consi der  sever al   appr oaches  to  contr ol   f or  ti m e  ef fects.    The  fi r st   i s  t o  include  a
standar  d  l inear   t im e  t rend.     Thi s  approach,   however ,  is  somewhat  restr ict ive  in  that   it   i s  based  on
t he  assumpti on  that   the  trend  i s  constant   t hroughout  the  sam ple  per i od.    To  som e  ext ent ,  thi s
probl em   may  be  mi ti gat ed  by  t he  incl usi on  of   a  quadrati c  t er m .    A  m ore  general  approach,  though, 
i s  to  use  a  piecewi se  li near  ‘spli ne’ .    T hi s  appr oach  i nvolves  di vi ding  the  t im e  per i od  i nt o  a  pr e- 
speci fi ed num  ber (n)   of  sub-per i ods  and  t hen  const r ucti ng  a  li near  funct ion  f or   each  sub- per iod. 
T he  l inear   f uncti ons  are  rest ri cted  so  that   they  join  t ogether  at   cert ai n  t hr eshol d  val ues  or  ‘knot s’ 
( see  Gr eene,   2000,  322-5) .    Bel ow,   we  use  t he  Akaike  Inf or mat ion  Cr i teri a  ( AI C)   to  choose  t he
appropr i at e  speci fi cat ion  of  the  t im e  t rend  (i ncl uding  the  value  of   n wher  e  appropri at e)   for  each
gam bl ing  sect or .    Accordi ngly,  we  onl y  repor t  resul ts  f r om   t he  best   speci fi cati on.     In  gener al ,
however ,   t he  specif i cati on  of   t he  ti m e  tr end  had  only  a  margi nal  im pact  on  our  resul t s. 
T he  f inal  econometr i c  issue  concer ns  the  speci fi cat ion  of  the  dem and  equat ion.    We  f ol low
t he  ‘ gener al - to  specif ic’   approach.    That   i s,  for   each  dependent  var iabl e,  we  begi n  by  esti m at ing  a
m odel   wi th  all   potent i al   expl anat ory  vari ables.    T his  i ncl udes  up  t o  four  lags  for   t he  pr ice  var iables
and  t he  lagged  dependent   vari abl e.     Next,   we  eli m inat e  var iables  that  have  li tt l e  or   no  expl anat ory
power ,  whi ch  result s  i n  a  m or e  par si m onious  fi nal   m odel .     Speci fi cal ly,  we  dr op  vari abl es
sequent  i al ly  on  t he  basi s  of  the  t -value  associat ed  wit h  each  coeff i ci ent ,  ceasi ng  only  when  all   t- 
val ues  are  si gnif icant ly  di ff er ent   t o  zer o  at  the  10%   l evel  or  bett er.     At  each  st age,  we  t est   f or
speci fi cat ion  probl ems:  aut ocor r el at i on,  ARCH  ef f ects,  nor mal it y  and  het eroscedast ici ty.    I f   t he
omi ssion  of  an  insi gni fi cant  var iabl e  r esul t s  in  the  di a g n o s i  s   o f    s p e c i f  i  c a t i  o n   p r  o b l  e m  s ,    w e   r  e t  a i n12
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t he  i nsi gnif i cant   vari abl e  in  t he  model .  We  wi ll   pr esent   est i mates  of  the  m ost  gener al
speci fi cat ion
4 and the f  inal,   par sim oni ous  speci fi cat ion. 
Bef or e  discussi ng  our  econometr i c  resul ts,  we  pr esent   an  over vi ew  of   t he  data  used  i n  our 
empir ical  analysi s  in  the  f ol lowing  secti on.     We  al so pr  ovide som  e descr i pt ive  inf or m at ion  on  the
i mpact  of  the  2001  changes  to  general   bet ti ng  dut y  on  vari ous  t ypes  of   gambli ng  acti vit y. 
IV.   Dat a  Descri pt ion 
Dat a  on  bett i ng  r evenue  wer e  der ived  fr om   t he  monthly  t ax  repor ts  pr ovided  by  HM
Customs and Excise.    Unt  i  l October   2001,  the  t ax  on  bet t ing  was  l evi ed  as  a  propor ti on  of   r evenue.
Consequent ly,   dat a  on  tax  r ecei pts,  along  wi th  knowledge  of  tax  r at es,   al low  us  to  deri ve  t otal  off -
course  bet ti ng  revenue  f or  each  mont h  f rom  Apr il   1987 t  o S  ept em ber  2001.     Not e  that  pri or   t o
Apr il   1987,  tax  was  payable  on  bet s  placed  on- course  and  so  figur es  ar e  not   com par abl e.     Af t er 
Oct ober   2001,   HM Customs and Excise provi  ded us wit  h tot  al   r evenue  figur es  for  bet ti ng  di rectl y. 
Revenue  is  defl at ed  by  t he  mont hly  r etail   pr ice  index,  usi ng  Januar y  2002  as  our   base  m onth.     We
also  test  for   seasonal   ef fect s  and  adjust   bett ing  r evenue  by  running  prel im inar y  r egr essi ons  of
r evenue  on  m ont h  dum mi es.     Cont r ol s  are  also  i ncl uded  i n  t he  econom etr ic  model  for   t he  number
of Satur  days  in  each  m ont h  and  for   t he  mont h  of  the  Grand  Nat ional,   an  i conic  horse  rat e  that
att ract s  easi ly  m or e  bet t ing  int er est   t han  any  ot her  event   i n  t he  year .
5
T he  L ot t er y  pri ce  i s  cal cul at ed  as  t he  mean  expected  val ue  of   a  l ot t er y  ticket  in  dr aws
t aking  place  in  t hat   m ont h.     The  expect ed  value  is  calculated  f ol lowing,   for  example,   F or rest  et   al 
( 2000a) .     Pr i ces  fr om  the  other   im por tant   gambli ng  sect ors,  amusement  machi nes  and  casi nos,   ar e
                                                   
4 F or   r eas on s  o f  sp ace,  we  on ly   r epo rt  resu lts   includ in g  the  lagg ed   v ariab les   w her e  th ese  h av e  s ig n if  ican t
exp lanator y  p ow er .13
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m or e  pr obl em ati c.     Dut y  on  am usement   machines  is levi  ed as a li  cense f ee  per  machi ne.     Thus, 
we  const ruct   a  seri es  of   the  mean  li cense  r ate  per  machi ne.    Si mi lar ly,  the  dut y  on  casino  gam bl i ng
i s  levi ed  vi a  a  l icense  fee  on  est abl ishm ent s,   wher e  the  size  of  the  f ee  is  r el ated  to  total   t ur nover .
T hi s  dut y  is  payabl e  over   a  6-m ont h  account i ng  peri od  wi th  some  i nt eri m  payment s  also  bei ng  due. 
S ince  1987,  the  l icense  rat es  changed  i n  Oct ober   1991  and  then  agai n  i n  Apr il   of   1998,  1999,   2000
and  2001.    Most   of  these  changes  wer e  f ai rl y  m odest   i n  nat ur e  and  basi cal ly,  adj ustm ent s  for 
i nf lati on.     An  excepti on  was  the  change  i n  Apr il   1998,  whi ch  repr esent ed  a  si gni fi cant  reducti on  in
t he  over al l  rat e  of   duty.     In  t he  econometr i c  wor  k below, we constr  uct   a dumm  y  var iable  f or   this
change and use this to esti  mate  subst it ut ion  eff ect s. 
As  di scussed  above,   the  avail abl e  dat a  do  not  per mi t  us  to  constr uct   a  m eaningf ul  measure
of the pri  ce for bi  ngo so,   i  nstead we use bi  ngo r  evenue (inst  r  um  ented by its l  agged values) in the
economet ri c  model .    Data  on  bingo  revenue  subj ect   t o  dut y  ar e  der ived  fr om  infor mati on  pr ovi ded
by  HM  Cust om s  and  E xci se. 
6
F igur es  1- 4  present   mont hly  dat a  f or   Januar y  1999  t hr ough  August  2002  in  four   segm ent s
of  the  gam bl i ng  i ndust ry:   bet ti ng,   l ott er y  draws,   scr at chcar ds  and  bingo.     Data  on  r evenue  from
Nat ional   L ot t er y  dr aws  and  scrat chcar ds  wer e  provided  t o  us  by  Camel ot ,  the  organi zat ion  that
m anages  the  Nat ional   L ot t er y  for   t he  U. K.   Governm ent.     Analysis  of  dat a  from  thi s  per iod  al l ows
us  to  exam ine  t he  i m pact   of   t he  October   2001  r educt ion  in  Gener al   Bett ing  Dut y  on  the  dem and  f or 
gam bl ing.    F i gure  5  shows  m onthl y  tax  r ecei pts  f r om   bet t ing.     T he  vert ical  li ne  on  each  graph
r ef er s  to  the  t ax  r educt i on  i n  Oct ober  2001. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
5 Patterson   (2 00 0)  co ntain s  a  go o d  discu ssio n   o f  the  season ality   issu e.    N ote  we  also   ru n  stand ard   statio narity tests, fin ding 
little  eviden ce  that  any   of  the  tu rn o ver  series  are  n on -station ary.
6  Cer tain   categ or ies  o f  ‘s m all- scale’  b in go   g ames  are  exem pt  f r om   d uty   ( fo r   examp le,  g ames  with  pr ize  m on ey
b elow   certain   amo un ts  pr o mo ted  b y  pr ivate  club s  and   o rg anizatio ns ).    Thes e  games   are  ex clud ed  fr o m  ou r  analy s is .14
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As expected,   Fi  gure 1 suggest  s that the t  ax reducti  on had a signi  fi  cant impact of the t  ax
r educti on  on  bett  ing  r evenue.     The  upward  t r end  in  the  ser ies  appear s  to  comm ence  som e  ti me
pri or   t o  t he  actual   change  in  t ax.     There  i s  anecdotal  evi dence  t hat   som e  small er  bookm aker s
ant icipated  the  change,  and  r educed  bet ti ng  deducti ons  in  advance  of   t he  tax  reducti on.     There  i s  no
evi dence,  however ,  that  any  of  the  establ ished  bookmaker s  began  r epatr iat ing  their   oper at ions
bef or e  the  t ax  changes  were  f or m al ly  announced.    We  wil l   expl or e  thi s  issue  econom et r ical ly  in  t he
next secti  on of   t he  paper .
E vi dence presented in the other   fi  gur  es i  s inconsistent   wi  th the not  ion that there have been
subst ant ial  decli nes  i n  revenue  in  ot her  segment s  of  the  gam bli ng  i ndust r y.     Fi nal ly,   i n  Fi gur e  5,  we
r epor t  monthl y  tax  recei pts  f rom   bet t ing.     The  r educt ion  i n  the  eff ect ive  t ax  r ate  had  a  si gni fi cant
i mpact  on  recei pt s,   reducing  them  by  about  one  t hir d  on  the  previ ous  year .    T hi s  i mm edi at e  impact 
on  tax  revenues  was  full y  ant ici pated,  al though  tax  r evenues  were  expect ed  to  r ecover   i n  the
m edium to longer-  ter  m. 
I n  the  next  secti on  of   t he  paper ,  we  constr uct   m ult ivar i at e  model s  of  the  t ur nover   seri es  t o
analyze  the  impact  of  the  t ax  r educt i on  m or e  f ul l y. 
V.  Em pi rical   Resu lt s
P ar am et er  est im at es  of   t he  demand  equat ion  ( equat ion  (1) )  are  presented  i n  Table  1.     A
descr  ipt  ion of the var  iables used in our regressi  on anal  ysis is cont  ai  ned i  n the Dat  a Appendix.
S ever al   point s  shoul d  be  made  about  the  r esult s  present ed  in  Tabl e  1.  The  f ir st   is  t hat   t he
empir ical  analysi s  is  based  on  monthl y  data,   alt hough  f i gures  f or   S ept em ber ,  Oct ober ,   and
Novem ber   2001  are  appr oxi mate  ( due  t o  aggregat ion  by  Customs  and  Excise) .     A  second  poi nt   i s
t  hat the m  odel was est  im  ated for   t  he enti  re sampl  e peri  od (Apri  l 1987 to Januar  y 2002) and then15
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j ust  for   t he  peri od  duri ng  which  U.K.   Nat ional   L ott er y  ticket s  have  been  sold  ( Novem ber   1994
t o  January  2002).     Col um ns  (1)  and  ( 2)  pr esent   f i ndings  for  the  ent i re  sample  peri od,   whi le
col um ns  (3)  and  ( 4)   cont ain  r esult s  for   t he  “L ot t er y  Per iod. ”    Anot her   st yl ized  fact   is  t hat   t her e  was
an  absence  of   any  si gnif i cant   di ff er ences  between  l ong  run  and  shor t   r un  ef fect s,  whi ch  coul d  be
due  t o  our   use  of   m ont hl y  dat a.     F inall y,   we  not e  t hat  each  var iant   of   t he  model   f it s  qui te  well ,   as
t he  R
2  values range f rom  0.7133  t o  0. 8722. 
As expected,   the coeff  ici  ent on the bet ti ng  tax  var iabl e  i s  negat ive  and  hi ghly  st at i st ical l y
signi fi cant  in  each  of   t he  four   speci fi cati ons  of   t he  m odel.     Our   esti mat es  of  the  t ax  el ast icit y  are
–0. 502  and  –0.555.    These  r esul t s  suggest   t hat   a  50%  reducti on  in  t he  tax  r at e  on  bet ti ng  wi ll   r esult 
i n  a  25%   i ncr ease  i n  t he  demand  for  bet ti ng.     The  elast i ci ty  esti mat es  i m pl y  an  absol ut e  pri ce
elast ici ty  f or  bett i ng  t hat   i s  signi f icantl y  higher   t han  uni t y.     For   exam pl e,   based  on  the  mean  pri ce
and  dut y  l evels  over   t he  sample  peri od,   t he  bett i ng  pri ce  el ast icit y  est i mates  are  - 1.59  and  - 1. 62. 
Another   key  findi ng  is  t hat   t he  coef f icient s  on  the  Oct ober  2001  dum my  vari able  ar e
posit ive  and  st at ist ical l y  si gni fi cant  in  each  vari ant  of  the  m odel .   T hi s  im pli es that   t  he tax change
announced in October   2001 i  nduced an incr  ease in demand  for  on- shor e  bet t ing,   and  that  this  event 
began  t o  r egi st er   f i ve  m ont hs  before  the  act ual  implementati on  of   t he  tax  changes. 
A  caveat   t o  thi s  resul t  shoul d  be  not ed.    I t   i s  conceivabl e  that  som e  of   the  increase  i n  on- 
shore bett ing  exper i enced  by  dom esti c  booki ng  est abli shm ents  consist s  of   bett ing  act i vi ty  t hat   had
been  tr ansact ed  by  off -shor e  br anches  of  these  same  bookmaki ng  fi rm s.    T o  t he  extent   that   t his  i s
occur ri ng,   a  non- negli gi ble  per centage  of   t he  increase  in  bet ti ng  m ay  ref lect   not  ‘new’   dem and,  but 
r at her  thi s  transfer   f rom   off -shor e  to  on-shor e  bet ti ng  outl ets.  Unf or tunat el y,   it   i s  not   possibl e  to
separ at e  out   such  ef fect s  i n  the  dat a  t hat  wer e  provi ded  t o  us. 16
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T he  other par  am  et er   esti m at es  ar e  gener al ly  consi st ent  wit h  our   expect at i ons.     That  is, 
f or   t he  enti r e  sampl e  per iod,   t her e  appears  to  be  an  inver se  relati onshi p  bet ween  unemploym ent 
and  dem and  and  a  posit ive  r el at i onshi p  between  wages  and  dem and.    T he  coeff icients  on  t he
Nat ional   L ot t er y  dum my  vari ables  provide  onl y  weak evidence that the i  nt  r  oducti  on of   the Lot  tery
r educed  bett i ng  r evenues.     Only  the  int roducti on of   Wednesday draws appears t  o be associated
wit h  a  stati sti call y  signif icant   decl ine  in  the  dem and for   bett  ing.     On  the  other,   we  f ind  str ong
evi  dence of a r  esponse i  n t  he demand for bet  ti  ng to pri  ce changes i n  the  Nat i onal   Lott er y,  as
evi  denced by the fact that the coeff  i  ci  ents on L  ott  er  y Pri ce  ar e posit  ive and  st at ist ical ly  si gni fi cant . 
S peci fi cal ly,   est im ates  of  the  cross  pr ice  elast i ci ty  of   bet t ing  wi t h  respect   t o  t he  Nati onal  Lot tery
are  +0. 355  and  +0.396.     T hi s  resul t  is  consi st ent   wit h  U.S .- based  evidence  of   substi t ut ion  bet ween
t he  l ot t er y  and  other  for ms  of  gam bl i ng  ( Si egel  and  Anders  ( 2001) .    Whi le  we  f ind  no  evi dence  of
subst it uti on  fr om   m achines  or   casi no  gambli ng  to  bett ing,  there  i s  str ong  evi dence  of   subst i tuti on
f rom  bi ngo,  alt hough  not   duri ng  the  Lot tery  peri od.     Lastl y,   as  expect ed,   gam bl i ng  acti vi ty  was
signi fi cantl y  l ower   in  t he  mont h  of  Pri ncess  Diana’ s  death.
I n  assessi ng  our  resul ts,   i t  is  im por tant   t o  not e  t hat  what  we  ar e  onl y  est im at i ng  t he  demand
f or   on- shore  bett ing i  n the UK.    Given that   the bet  ti  ng tax changes im  pl  ement  ed in October 2001
wer e  at   least   par ti all y  the  r esult   of   agr eem ent  on  the  par t  of  major   UK  bookm akers  t o  r epat r iate
t heir   of f- shore  oper at ions  in  t he  wake  of   t he  tax  changes,   t his  caveat   i s  especi al ly  cr it ical.     Also, 
UK  bookm aker s  agr eed  t o  end  deduct ions  on  bett or s,  so  t hat   t he  GP T  was  covered  ent ir ely  by  the
operator  s themsel  ves.  T  he im  pact of   enhanced mar  ket com  peti  t  ion must al  so be considered as a
key  f act or   i nfl uenci ng  bookmaker 's  pr of it   m argins,  wi th  consequent  eff ect s  on  t he  el ast icit y  of
dem and  for   bett ing. 17
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VI.   Con clu si ons
A  r apid  ri se  i n  gam bl ing  has  height ened  int er est   i n  ident if ying  dem and  charact eri st i cs  and
opt im al   level s  of   t axati on.     In  this  paper,   we  pr esent  som e  preli mi nar y  economet ri c  evi dence  on  the
dem and  response  of  bet ti ng  acti vit ies  i n  the  U.K.   t o  recent  changes  in  t he  st ructure  of   bet t ing
t  axat  ion.  A key resul  t is that   the dem  and for   bett  ing appear  s to be highly sensit  ive t  o changes in
t ax  r at  es.    In part  i  cular  , the reduct  ion in the rat  e of   bett  i  ng t  ax in October 2001 appears to have
i nduced  a  fai rl y  lar ge  i ncr ease  in  t he  demand  for   on- shore  bett ing. 
Our   f indings  al so  i m pl y  that  bet ti ng  in  str eet -corner   gambli ng  establi shm ents  and  the
l ot tery  ar e  str ong  subst i tutes,   at   l east  in  the  short -r un.     The  r esult s  also  suggest   that   am usem ent 
m achi nes  and  casi no  gambl ing  ar e  str ong  substi tut es  f or   the  lot tery.     Unf or tunat el y,   gi ven  our 
som ewhat   shor t  “post -event”  window,  it  is  di ff icult   f or   us  t o  project  long- term   im pacts.
  T he  i ssues  di scussed  i n  t hi s  paper   may  be  even  more  i m port ant   i n  the  U. S.   t han  i n  the  U.K. 
T  hat is because i  ssues r  egarding  gam bli ng  ar e  typicall y  r esolved  at  the  stat e  level,   since  state
legi slatur es  have  jurisdicti on  over  most  aspect s  of  gam bli ng.    The  l ast   two  decades  have  seen
intense  competi tion  among  the  stat es  to  internalize  gam bli ng  revenues,  usi ng  ri ver boat  and  Nati ve
Am er ican  casinos,  lotteries,   and  video  poker   games  t o  attr act  gambli ng  pat rons.     T hi s  has  pr obably
resulted i  n  str onger   subst it uti on  ef fects,   since  m ot ori sts  can  easil y  patr onize  gambling
establi shm ents  or  pl ay  the  l ott ery  i n  neighbori ng  st ates.    F urt her more,   ther e  i s  l ikely  to  be  greater
interest  i n  est imati ng  such  impact s  in  the  U.S. ,  due  to  the  recent   f air ly  sever e  r ecession.    This
economi  c downturn has height  ened concer  ns (at t  he st  ate level) regar  ding t  ax revenue and t  he
possibi lit y  that  t here  may  be  displacem ent   effects  associated  with  t he  growt h  of  gam bli ng.     These
di  splacement   ef  fects ar  e a m  ajor concer  n, as many U.  S. states have become increasi  ngly dependent
on l  ott  eri  es to fund educati  onal programs and other off  -budget items.18
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Final ly,   it   i s  i nteresti ng  to  note  that  tax  r evenue  fr om   gambli ng  pal es  i n  com par ison  t o
r evenue that   is generated  f rom  alcohol,   gasoli ne,   and  t obacco.    T hus,  in  determ i ni ng  opti mal   t ax
pol icies, it   woul  d be useful to extend our model   to i  ncl  ude these comm  odi  ti  es.  This woul  d all  ow
us  to  determ i ne  whet her  alcohol ,   gasoli ne,  and  t obacco  are  substi tut es  or   com pl ement s  f or   bett ing.19
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Figure 1: Off-C  ourse B  etting Revenue
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Figure 2: Lottery D  raw   S  ales
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Sea  so  na  lly a  d  ju  st  ed   £ million  , 198  7 price  s
Figure 3: Scratchcard Sal  es
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Figure 4: Bi  ngo Turnover (subject to duty)
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Sea  so  na  lly a  d  ju  st  ed   £ million  , 200  2 price  s
Figure 5: General   B  etting D  uty R  ecei  pts
Dat  e










T ab le  1 
Dep en den t  Va ria bl e:  Th e  Dem an d  for  B ettin g  in  th e  U.K.
1 2  3  4 
E ntire  Perio d  L ottery   Peri o d
Dem an d  (t-1) -0. 03 9
(0. 08 7)
-- -
B etti ng   Ta x -0. 52 3* * *
(0. 07 7)
-0. 55 5* * *
(0. 05 1)
-0. 50 2* * *
(0. 02 5)
-0. 51 6* * *
(0. 03 1)
Wag es  1 .6 57 ** 
(0. 82 3)
-1  . 7  2 5  
(1. 49 6)
-
Unemp lo y ment -0. 43 3* * *
(0. 16 5)





L ottery   Price n /a n /a 0 .3 55 ** 
(0. 15 7)
0 .3 96 ** 
(0. 17 4)
B in go  0 .2 43 ** 
(0. 09 6)
0 .2 75 ** * 
(0. 10 0)
0 .2 58 
(0. 24 7)
-
Amu semen t  Ma chi ne
T ax 
0 .0 02 
(0. 10 2)
-- 0 .   41 3
(0. 29 6)
-




-0  . 0  7 2  
(0. 06 8)
-
Natio na l   L ottery -0. 05 5
(0. 05 4)
-n  / a n /a
S cratch cards  -0. 00 8
(0. 05 4)
-0  . 0  4 0  
(0. 05 5)
-
Wed nesd a y -0. 11 9* * 
(0. 05 5)





T hu nd er -0. 08 6* 
(0. 04 5)
-- 0 .   09 8* 
(0. 05 8)
-
E xtra  -0. 08 4
(0. 05 8)
-- 0 .   06 6
(0. 06 1)
-
Octob er  20 01  0 .5 69 ** 
(0. 26 2)
0 .5 48 ** * 
(0. 17 1)
0 .5 76 ** 
(0. 28 0)
0 .4 89 ** * 
(0. 07 9)
Dia na  -0. 07 8* * *
(0. 02 1)
-0. 07 7* * *
(0. 01 9)
-0. 05 8* * 
(0. 02 7)
-0. 05 6* * *
(0. 01 7)
Con stan t 7 .7 20 
(3. 60 1)
1 3. 99 8* * *
(0. 60 1)
8 .4 36 
(6. 44 8)
1 2. 53 9* * *
(0. 68 4)
T im e 5 -p t  sp l in e 5 -p t  sp l in e 2 -p t  sp l in e 2 -p t  sp l in e
N 1 83  1 84  9 3 9 3
R
2  0 .7 41 6 0 . 7  1 3  3 0  . 8  5 9  5 0  . 8  7 2  2
S arga n  tes t n /a n /a 1 .9 81  1 .2 92 
AR test 1 .0 51  0 .6 34  0 .4 46  0 .5 64 
ARCH tes  t 0 .1 73  2 .4 53  0 .1 92  0 .0 24 
Norma li ty 0 .2 99  1 .6 53  0 .9 94  0 .0 92 
Heteros  ced as ticity 0 .9 28  1 .5 26  5 .5 87 ** *  1 .0 91 
N otes:
(i)  D ep end en t  v ariab le  is  log   o f  season ally   ad ju sted  mo n th ly ,  real exp  en  d iture  (19 87   prices)  o n  b etting .
(ii)  All  con tin uo us  variables  are  measu red  in  lo g s.
(iii)  F igu res  in  brack ets  are  ro bu st  stan dard  errors.
(iv  ) Betting   Tax rate is calculated as prop o rtio n   o f  tu rno ver  tak en   in   G eneral  B ettin g  Du ty /Gross  P ro fit  T ax .
(v)  L ottery  P rice  is  instru mented  by   size  o f  rollov er  d raw s  and   add ition al  draw s  in  that  mo n th .    Bing o  turno v er is instru mented   by   its
o wn   lag g ed   v alu e.
(vi)  ** *   ind icates  sig nifican ce  at  the  1 %   lev el;  * *  at  th e  5 %  lev el;  *   1 0%   level.26
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Data  Ap p en di x :  Descrip ti o n  of  Va ri ab l es   Used   i n  the  E co n om etric  Ana l ys is 
Bet ting   Dema n d S easo nally   ad ju sted   mo nth ly   r eal  exp end itur e  ( 19 8 7  pr ices)   o n   o ff -co ur se
b etting .
S ou rce:   HM  Cu stom s  a nd   Excise.
Lot tery   Dema n d W eekly  r eal  exp en ditur e  ( 19 87   p r ices )   o n  Natio nal  Lotter y  Satur day  and 
W ed nesd ay  dr aws .
S ou rce:  Ca  melot.
S crat ch card  D eman d W eekly,  real  ex pend itu re  (1 98 7  p rices )  on   th e  Natio nal  Lotter y  Scratch car ds .
S ou rce:  Ca  melot.
Bin go   D ema nd  S easo nally   ad ju s t e d    m o  n t h  l y  ,   r e a l   e x  p en ditu r e  (1 9 87   p rices )  o n  bing o   s ub ject  to 
d uty.
S ou rce:   HM  Cu stom s  a nd   Excise.
Bet ting   Ta x Rate of   GBD u  p to   6 
t h Octo ber   2 00 1 .    F ro m   6 
t h Octo ber ,  it  is   b oo k maker   g ro ss 
p ro fits   as   a  percen tag e  o f  to tal  tur no ver .
S ou rce:   derived   fro m   info rm atio n   s up p lied   b y  H M  Cus to ms   &  Excis e.
Lot tery   Price Exp ected   v alu e  of   a  lo ttery   tick et,  calcu lated   f o llow in g ,  fo r   examp le,  F o rr es t,
G ulley  &   S im m on s  (2 0 00 a) 
S ou rce:   derived   fro m   info rm atio n   s up p lied   b y  Cam elo t.
G PT  in  Pla ce D um my   f o r  per io d  in   wh ich   G PT  h as  been  in   p lace:  =1   f ro m   o n;  =  0  oth er wis e.
Wag es  S easo nally   ad ju s t e d    a v  e r  a g e   e a r  n  i n  g s    i n  d e x   i n   t h  e   U  K ,   1  9  8 7    p  r  i c e s  .
S ou rce:   Office of Na  tion a l  Statistics 
U nemp lo y ment  Claim an t  cou n t  un em p lo ym ent  r ate  in  the  U K
S ou rce:   Office of Na  tion a l  Statistics 
A mu semen t  Ma chine  Tax  Mean  rate  of   tax  per   amu s em en t  m achin e.
S ou rce:   HM Cu  stom  s &   Excise.
C as in o  G ambling   Tax 
D ow n
D um my   f o r  sig nifican t  red uction   in   casino   g amb lin g  tax  in  19 9 8:  =  1   fr om   1
s t
A pr il  1 9 98   o n ;  =  0  o th er w is e.
N at io na l  Lot t ery D um my   f o r  start  o f  N atio n al  Lotter y:  = 1 fr  o  m No  v   1 99 4  o n;  = 0 other wise.
S crat ch cards  D um my   f o r  Lo ttery   S cratch card s:  =  1  f ro m  25 
t h March 1  99 5;  =  0  oth er wis e
Wed nesd a y D um my   f o r  Lo ttery   W edn es d ay   d raw :  =  1   f ro m  2 5
t h Feb 19 9 7;  =  0  other wise
Thu nd er D um my   f o r  Th u nd er ball  dr aw:  =  1   fr om   6
t h Dec 19  9  9; = 0 other  wise
Ext ra  D um my   f o r  Lo ttery   Ex tr a  d raw:  =  1  fr o m  15 
t h No v  19 9 9;  =  0  other wise
G PT  in  Pla ce D um my   f o r  th e  p er io d   in  w hich   G P T  has   b een in place: =1   fr  om   on  ; = 0 
o th er wis e.
O ct ob er 20  01  D um my   f o r  th e  intro d uctio n  of   G P T:  =  1  fo r  w eek  ( mo nth)   of   6 
t h Oct, 2  0 01 ;  =  0 
o th er wis e.
D ia na  D um my   f o r  th e  d eath   of   P  r  i n  c e s s    D i a n  a :   = 1    f o r  week  (m on th)   o f   7 
t h Sept 1 9 99 ;  =
0   o th er w is e.